Knowing other-wise: a discussion of alterity and the limits of philosophy by Hart, Hendrik
Knowing of/ter-wise: a discussion of alterity 
and the limits of philosophy
Hendrik Hart
Institute for Christian Studies 
Toronto, Ontario 
CANADA
Abstract
Hendrik Stoker and Herman Dooyeweerd discussed the relation between 
philosophy’s universality and the independence o f the individually real 
That issue is currently discussed by postmodern philosophers exploring the 
limits o f philosophy related to contemporary concern for inclusivity and 
alterity. I take up this issue by arguing that philosophy has limits. I f  these 
are not observed, philosophy contributes to exclusion or oppression o f  
whatever transcends these limits. If, for example, philosophy imperiously 
sets the tone for our total relation to the real, its limits shrink our relation 
to the real. For i f  philosophy is limited by a focus on what is same, such 
imperious tonesetting will exclude the different from our attention. Calling 
attention to the inclusion and liberation o f 'dijferents ’ is a contribution o f  
postmodernity. Rut I ask: can such calling attention remain philosophical 
without philosophy remaining imperial? Possibly our knowing o f the dif­
ferent must be a knowing that differs from knowing the same. In my view, 
knowing what is ‘otherwise than being', is knowing otherwise than knowing 
philosophically. Such knowing will be otherwise by being wise to the other, 
in trust. It will not be a grasping o f the other in and by a concept that is the 
same.
Prefacc
Hendrik Stoker’s concern that philosophy be inclusive was especially evident in 
his discussions with Herman Dooyeweerd, both orally and in writing, spread over 
some thirty years from the early thirties to the mid-sixties. Stoker’s contributions 
to these discussions occur especially in the last two essays o f Oorsprong en rig­
ting 2 (1970: 202-410). For Dooyeweerd the most important places to consult 
are in A New Critique o f Theoretical Thought (1953:94-107 vol. 1 and 1957:61- 
76 vol. 3).
Stoker did not want to neglect or exclude any aspect o f created reality, no matter 
how seemingly insignificant. He was concerned, for example, that Dooyeweerd
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did not do justice to the actual and concrete reality o f events or to the peculiar 
particularity o f individuals. To give expression to his concern Stoker proposed 
not only the cosmic dimension o f  events, but also the category o f  the ‘idion,’ the 
irreducible reality o f something creaturely ‘in its own right’, or, as he expressed 
it, its “eie-standigheid” . Stoker feared that Dooyeweerd’s thought obliterated 
some dimensions o f creation with his pervasive and encompassing view o f crea­
tion’s law side. He wanted to stress that all creatures have an inviolable, irre­
ducible right to a difference o f  their own being.
Dooyeweerd maintained, however, that Stoker’s concerns threatened to neglect 
the creature’s total dependence on the law o f God, as well as that these concerns 
should not lead to philosophy’s dealing with everything whatsoever. Philosophy 
has its limits. And some o f Stoker’s concerns, real though they were, transcen­
ded the proper limits o f philosophy in Dooyeweerd’s view.
I have always sympathised with both men. I agreed with Dooyeweerd that philo­
sophy has its limits and that Stoker seemed too eager not merely to do justice to 
all reality , but to do so philosophically. But 1 also heard in Stoker’s objections 
an intuition that in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy little space was left in the universe 
for the reality o f creation beyond its law side.
At that time it would have been impossible to articulate what today might be 
called a ‘postmodern’ intuition in Stoker: a respect for inclusivity and alterity that 
was absent in traditional philosophy. In Dooyeweerd such ‘postm odern’ intui­
tions were arguably present as well, though not in the area o f Stoker’s concerns. 
Dooyeweerd’s are found more in his analysis o f the autonomy o f reason. Stoker 
was out to include the individual in its own individuality. However, his concep­
tualization or thematization o f his ‘inclusivity intuition’ may have been partly to 
blame for a troubling inconsistency, which only now, given our postmodern as 
well as our approaching post-apartheid context, becomes clear to us. This incon­
sistency comes to the surface in his desire to include the different within the 
philosophical arena o f the same, which may have left him blind to apartheid as a 
reality o f exclusion. It is possible that the only inclusion o f the black other he 
could muster was within a white intellectual system which in the reality o f 
practice oppressed and excluded that black other Possibly Stoker’s intuitions 
about alterity remained so imprisoned within a conceptual system, in spite o f  his 
intentions, that the real other, in his case the black other, escaped his full atten­
tion. Possibly, though Stoker’s intuition about Dooyeweerd was right, Dooye­
weerd was also right to say that a more inclusive philosophy would not be the 
way to deal with the problem.
May room for an other, conceptually enclosed in a theoretical view, perhaps 
make it difficult to keep sight o f the actual other? Is it possible that justice for an 
other confined to a conceptual system results, not in a genuine plurality o f people,
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but rather in others reduced to otheme.vs, while real others are kept ‘out’ or 
apart? To honour Stoker in the centennial year o f Dooyeweerd’s birth, I take up 
the issue they raised once again, though not by revisiting their discussion. Rather, 
I address the issue in its postmodern form. But I also treat it within the frame­
work o f the tradition in which Stoker and Dooyeweerd worked, namely that of 
reformational philosophy. I want to explore the limits of philosophy in relation to 
our concern for alterity, by placing philosophy in relation to the philosophizing 
self. It will then appear that concern for an other which remains a philosophical 
concern, may be limited to a concern for an other who is self-same. A merely 
philosophical concern for alterity thus may keep a truly other self apart from the 
world o f same selves. On the other hand, a concern for an other which includes 
that other in my own world, may require an awareness o f that world beyond the 
limits o f philosophy, a being present in the world beyond the limits o f being as 
presence.
1. The typical W estern Ego
Western self-identity at its core has strong traditional connections with self as 
being, a self whose being is being rational. Examples are Descartes’ cogito, 
Kant’s transcendental-logical ego, and the popular self-definition o f ‘man’ as ra­
tional animal. The note of triumph in cogito ergo sum is the certainty o f being: 
‘Therefore I a m It is a triumph rooted in its being established rationally: 
cogito! ergo. So there! Self-assured reassurance of being self.
This Western self, for all practical purposes as well as essentially, is a privileged 
white, heterosexual, and powerful male in whose own life as thinking subject 
other human functions such as trust, feeling, sensation, emotion, being body, and 
others are thought less of. A self who ‘de-fines’ himself as rational self, sur­
rounds himself by or encloses himself within rational boundaries: the fin e s ' with­
in which he is self. That excludes these other functions from his proper self, even 
if he cannot deny they are his. Further, this rational self, in a manner o f speaking, 
also ‘excludes’ or sees as outside the rational enclosure within which he is being 
himself, ‘other’ selves who are not same selves. That is, he excommunicates 
from proper humanity, to one degree or other, women, poets and painters as truth- 
makers, homosexuals, Jews, the poor, people of colour, and others (Lloyd 1984; 
Nye, 1990).
The rational self, reason, also sees whatever is other than the sameness in whose 
guise all things appear to this self, as outside of the enclosure of proper being. 
So he depreciates difference, transcendence, subjectivity, individuality, spiri­
tuality, feeling, and more. The real world of this rational-world-making-self is 
thus a reduced world. Like the self that /?roject-ed it and thus oA-ject-ified it, it is 
a world o f being, whose being is its being immutably rational, cast in the mould
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of reason by being held out before it in a fixed gaze, then cast out. Rational 
being is true, essential, real being. The rest o f what there is, is a reality manqué, 
is-not, has no being, is called mê on by Parmenides. His stage-setting demar­
cation o f thinking, being, and sameness still has most o f philosophy in its grip. 
Postmodern divided selves may be divided precisely because of their reluctance 
to really let go totally o f the totalizing grip o f rational sameness.
2. Initial observations about philosophy’s role in the world o f  
reason
To put his life ‘in order’ the rational self, also known as reason, autonomously 
develops a rational tradition known as philosophy: the story o f the thinking self 
who in philosophy orders or structures being in its immutable universality, to­
tality, and self-identity; being as present to thought. The word o f philosophy, in 
this tradition, is a first and last word. Philosophy, or reason in philosophy, makes 
sense o f “it all” (Bruggemann-Kruyff, 1993).
Philosophy in this philosophical tradition -  in its disciplines, important figures, 
and movements -  has mainly two different, though related versions: philosophy as 
rational theory o f the most general order or structure o f what, generally speaking, 
there is or is there (for example ontology, metaphysics, Kant, Husserl, analytic 
philosophy) and philosophy as practical wisdom (for example moral philosophy, 
philosophy o f culture, Pascal, Kierkegaard, pragmatism). Sometimes the two 
traditions come together (Heidegger). In both versions philosophy is the rational 
product o f a rational self, a reasoned body o f thought with universal validity, 
known as truth. This remains true even where we see a struggle between the 
priority o f being empirical and the legitimacy o f being speculative, for example 
between Lockeans and Cartesians; misleadingly identified as empiricists and 
rationalists. For the empiricists, too, were rationalists (Schouls, 1980).
There is, o f course, nothing wrong with thinking rationally about the ultimate 
issues of human life, whether in structure-theoretical terms or in terms o f practical 
wisdom. It has been helpful, for example, that in developing the philosophical 
tradition we rationally discovered certain dangers to human existence. The 
Enlightenment discovered such dangers in blind faith, absolute authority, and 
superstition and marked these as unreasonable. Nevertheless, the ‘overall ratio­
nal’ view of general structure and the contributions it makes are one thing, ‘ulti­
mate orientation’ in matters o f human destiny construed rationally is another. A 
rationally developed philosophical tradition genuinely contributes to putting our 
life in order by providing the broadest possible account, within the logical space 
o f reasons, o f how things broadly construed hang together in the broadest 
possible sense. Many readers o f  Richard Rorty do not notice that in most o f  his 
works this view o f philosophy is unproblematically acceptable to him. However,
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when reason rcplaccs myth and spirituality, when it disqualifies our coping with 
the mystery o f life we encounter beyond the bounds of reason, when it denies that 
there are such bounds, does it then make a similar contribution? That is, if we 
assign to reason what was once done in faith (trust, not belief) on the ground that 
trust is necessarily blind, that its authority is absolute per se, and that its 
revelation is not reasonable, might that not amount to a closure of first order 
sourccs o f authentic wisdom?
A question thus arises: is it possible to develop a rational, universal, empirical 
account o f the eschatological, mystery laden, mythically articulated spirituality of 
the human journey between origin and destiny? Could it be that logo-power as 
first-last word, rational philosophy as path of wisdom, reason as comprehensive 
control o f reality via sameness, presence, and generality, m is-'leads’ us when we 
do not acknowledge this as reason taking on roles that are not as such rational? 
Are these not roles that develop within reason only if we trust reason as last 
word? And is that consistent with trust’s having been banned from the life of 
reason in this philosophical tradition?
The view of reason and philosophy as capable of encompassing reality or of 
reality as contained within the bounds of reason; that is, the view of reason in 
which it is the limit o f all things while it is itself unlimited, that view is likely 
related to, among others, the nature o f intellectual com-prehension o f sameness as 
well as to the intellectual aim for universality, neither o f which is necessarily 
improper. By aiming for a complete, full, total ‘grasp’ o f all properties and 
relations which we conceive as common to ‘all’ things o f some kind, we seem to 
conceive it com-prehensively. Reason, especially in philosophical thought, thus 
thinks totality, thinks it grasps totality in a single, universal, true image. The 
rational, theoretical, philosophical picture o f the Western tradition, however, can 
be seen as blowing this all up, as enlarging the philosophical picture without 
seeing that the world which fits within that picture has been fragmented. 
Intellectual grasp or conceptualization is taken as not just an idealized focus on 
one side o f  reality (Lakoff, 1987), but as grasp o f the whole truth, as grasp of 
what encompasses all reality, as having hold o f the controlling limits or boun­
daries o f the real.
With the rise o f this aspiration, reason desires to replace faith, religion, and 
fundamental (rust. But it may well not be ridding itself o f trust and authority. 
Instead, it may foster a new, though hidden, form o f trust in a new absolute 
authority, namely unconditional trust in the authority o f reason. Philosophy, in 
this new guise, offers itself as our guide with the problems o f life, to help us see 
who we are or may become. Philosophy, that is, replaces traditional religion by 
becoming the new religion o f the high priesthood o f  the intellectual generalist. 
But is philosophy then still rational/theoretical? Is the rational self who follows
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reason as the sure path to the promised land, as our prime hope for human happi­
ness, is that self in so doing still doing something rational?
3. Initial dem arcation o f some problems
Both feminist philosophers and postmodern thinkers have helped us become 
aware of problems in a philosophical tradition which is logocentric, that is, which 
not only orients itself as an intellectual tradition to being rational, but which also 
puts reason at the centre o f self, humanity, and the rest o f reality. The then un­
avoidable rational reduction o f whatever is real to its ‘being’, its sameness to rea­
son, results in equally unavoidable marginalization o f whatever is different: denial 
of what transcends reason, erasure o f the other, oppression o f what will not be so 
denied or erased (Code, 1991). Aristotle already struggled with these conse­
quences of our life’s orientation to reason, by indicating task divisions within the 
life o f reason between episteme and phronesis and between theoretical philo­
sophy and practical philosophy. I see in that straggle an acknowledgement o f 
certain limitations within reason on the one hand, while on the other hand an 
attempt is made to have reason remain universally totalizing nevertheless. Kant’s 
work on practical, theoretical, and aesthetic reason has similar characteristics. 
There is an intuitive awareness that rational philosophy is, on the one hand, con­
stitutionally incapable o f real totality, while on the other hand it seems as though 
the totality o f being remains within reason’s control. So if our life is to be put in 
order philosophically, both theoretically and practically, by a tradition o f reason 
which itself is limited and is not the limit o f the real, then what if  reason forgets 
those limits? Then subjectivity, individuality, and difference will not be able to 
find a place o f honour within the tradition, will be marginalized. The order o f a 
life thus put in order will be reduced to an order o f sameness, a sameness con­
centrated in a desire for power and control.
In our very day we see a continuation o f this straggle in the work o f people who 
have been impressed with the postmodern and feminist critique o f reason, but 
who struggle with taking their leave o f an essentially rational self which hangs on 
to an autonomous last word. Their solution seems to be the traditional one: build­
ing more o f what has to remain outside o f reason into reason itself. Then philo­
sophy can continue to excercise its power, but more inclusively. I raise the ques­
tion, however, whether we can expect any real healing from a rational philosophy 
tradition whose marginalization is unavoidable by the very fact o f  its being 
rational. Is a more inclusive philosophy likely, in which an exclusionary interest, 
reason, still is autonomous and has the first/ last word? Philosophy has limits, 
margins. Including alt things within those limits will marginalize what does not 
fit. If  philosophy is rational and reason’s focus 011 the same requires exclusion of 
the different, how then can philosophy as philosophy ever be truly universal in the 
sense o f doing justice to the real different? Is it realistic o f Habermas to place all
574 Koers 59(3 & 4) 1994:569-586
Hendrik Hart
his hope ill reason for overcoming his deepest cultural dread, distorted commu­
nication? Is Levinas aware that a philosophy which recognizes reality that 
transcends being, cannot do so if it remains rational philosophy? For reason 
gives us acccss to no more than being So can Levinas continue to speak philo­
sophically when lie seeks a (Inal vocabulary /ó/- relating ethically to another?
Do people like Levinas and Habermas want to rescue reason and philosophy as 
Rorty’s cultural overseer once more by acknowledging that the tradition has been 
too narrow? But an issue that may then be overlooked is whether or not there is a 
limit to what rational philosophy, a tradition speaking a last word of truth with 
universality, can accomplish. If a rational philosophy should properly have been 
expected to have done what some say it has neglected -  deal with the ‘other’, for 
example -  an accusation of neglcct makes sense only if rational philosophy can 
rationally deal with the other and do justice to this concern. So if rational 
philosophy is unable to deal with the other for some reason, a helpful approach 
to the oilier may have to come from elsewhere.
To put the matter somewhat differently: the accusation o f a neglectful rational 
philosophy is to the point if philosophy makes legitimate claims to dealing with 
totality, universality, or the encompassing. But if those claims are legitimately 
contested, if rational philosophy should not be perceived as competent to deal 
comprehensively with genuine totality, then we are in more difficult waters.
4. Initial exploration o f an approach
An approach to reason and philosophy in continuity with the above might be to 
see them as useful in a limited way, prompting the question: what might be the 
proper limits? Knowing such limits could help us assess a philosophical response 
to marginalization which would expect philosophy to be more inclusive. A move 
toward greater inclusion might, for example, appear to be more ‘politically’ 
correct. But if it would require rational philosophy to move beyond its own 
rational limits, the question remains: are we helped by taking steps loo big for our 
boots?
To make space for ‘others’ not now included in fullbloodcd rational being, we 
might, instead of doing something philosophical in which rational philosophy 
goes beyond the bounds of reason, consider that there’s life beyond philosophy. 
If something is other than the status it has in philosophy, this possibly reflects the 
fact that reality and life exceed the limits o f philosophy. By dealing with this 
other insofar as it can lit into philosophy we may always be leaving it ‘out’ as 
other, if indeed we can deal rationally with what is other only as same, that is, 
with ‘oilier’ as 'otherness'. And such could possibly be so, if by rational we 
mean being within the logical space o t  reasons. For in that space we can do 110
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more than conceptually generalize, by remaining subject to rules o f logic. But no 
general conceptual grasp o f ‘other’ can in any real sense ‘embrace’ an other. The 
really other remains outside o f the order o f concepts. In that case, to get access 
and do justice to what is other we may need channels that are ‘other than' reason, 
science, and philosophy. Film, novel, poem, other experiences (trust o f  myth and of 
mystery), other voices (the poor, women) all may help us get at ‘truth’ (a space 
for them where they can enter into the light and throw off their cover of 
sameness) in different and much needed ways; others need to be put into a 
different light in order to be really seen.
If we were to explore the limits o f reason, would we discover that it is limited to 
bringing to light general structures by uncovering them inside the logical space of 
reasons? Please note: I am talking about a truth-revealing task, a labour that 
‘brings to light’. But I am also talking limits: structural truth. The limit here is 
twofold: reason as our limited source o f light, structure as one kind  o f truth. Is 
that the core o f what in a long Western tradition people have meant by reason: 
containment o f reality within the boundaries o f conceptualization? And in that 
tradition, is conceptualization a grasping of real universal structures which all 
things objectively have in common by virtue o f things being enclosed by these 
structures? Are the ‘reasons’ o f which we speak when we say ‘logical space of 
reasons’ indeed grounding functions of propositional statements in which reality 
has been conceptualized in terms o f conceptual sameness? If answers to these 
questions tend toward the affirmative, then philosophy’s universality is a very 
limited universality. And then philosophy’s universality would become provincial 
if  it did not recognize these limits. Philosophy would then be an example of 
narrowmindedness in the very broadmindedness with which it decorates itself.
Suppose there were something to this. Then the very idea o f reason being aware 
o f its own limits would be reason conceptually grasping the order o f reasoning 
from within that order. But would that not amount to a very limited awareness of 
its own limits? And if those limits were not recognized? Would Gadamer then 
be right to unmask that as an unreasonable prejudice against prejudice? Would 
Dooyeweerd indeed be right that, necessarily, rational self-reflection requires 
more o f a self than being rational? Indeed, occasion for a New Critique (Dooye­
weerd, 1953-1958). A Critique, moreover, which is appropriately initiated by an 
inquiry into the self which in philosophy is trying to be self-critical.
If we stay with this for a moment we may entertain the idea that there is no need 
at this point to simply reject reason and philosophy. There might, after all, be a 
rational/ logical angle to any and everything whatsoever, so that even an appro­
priately limited reason might be able to present us with an analysis o f all things, 
including an analysis o f analysis, as well as an analysis o f  the other, the different, 
the transcendent. But that analysis would then be limited to otheme.v.v, difference,
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transcendence. Analysis would be a bringing to light o f hidden staictural mo­
ments o f all things. That is, it would be limited to a conceptual analysis, an ana­
lysis o f the concept o f other, different, transcendent. And the concept would (in 
the case of a theoretical concept) be a grasping o f implicit but uncovered struc­
ture, o f  a structural moment shared by things. It would be an analysis o f diffe­
rence, for example, as a same, as the difference we recognize all differences to 
be. But such an analysis o f an other or o f the other would never amount to doing 
justice to an other, embracing the other. Hence no more justice is being done to 
the other by creating more rational room for otherness in philosophy. And if it 
were mistakenly thought that more justice was being done, that could possibly 
result in more injustice continuing to be done.
If this is fruitful, we need to face the question: could conceiving rightly be con­
ceived as a comprehending? Could a concept be comprehensive in the sense of 
encompassing, total? That now becomes highly unlikely. And Kant’s (and 
Dooyeweerd’s) way out, namely that what transcends the concept is known as 
idea, is not a genuine way out, for their idea remains a rational way of knowing 
and the rational limits thus remain. If analysis is not com-prehension, if it only 
prehends a moment o f things, it is not everything, in spite o f its legitimate angle 
on everything. So it could not accomplish what we could achieve with approach­
es to reality that lie beyond reason, approaches that are other and different: trust, 
love, feeling, poetry, music, and so much more. Rational analysis could not, then, 
deliver what these other approaches could deliver in relation to the other, the 
transcendent, mystery, authority, the subjective, the individual, and so many 
more. Reason’s light and their light would differ.
The meaning o f reason I here explore is, o f course, writ large in science. Reason 
which logically explores concepts o f structure is the theoretical reason o f Aris­
totle and Kant, a professional rational operator in the logical space o f reasons. 
Science seeks through reason to grasp a continuous same, a constant configu­
ration o f properties common to all things of some kind, for purposes o f control. 
Lakoff (1987) has shown that this conceptualised same is at best an idealized 
same. But concepts are helpful. Concepts o f order allow us to explain and pre­
dict and thereby increase our control. Reason operates outside o f science as well 
and not all concepts are scientific concepts. But reason in science is proto- 
typically reason.
Parenthetically: I know that by rational or reasonable, people (philosophers too) 
can and do mean more than what is confined to the logical space o f reasons. But 
as soon as we do that, rational is no more than a metaphor for general approval, 
un unbounded term o f admiration, projected from our veneration o f what happens 
within the logical space o f reasons to any domain beyond that space in which hu­
mans operate. Rational then means the same as sensible, sane, right, appropriate,
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meaningful, normative, and so on. But in that case rational philosophy loses any 
specific meaning. It means: good philosophy, without specifically showing why 
it is good. But if  rational philosophy means: body o f claims and accounts formed 
within the logical space o f reasons, concerning the most general structure of 
things in general and thought to be uniquely correct, therefore having universal 
appeal; then we have a specific meaning o f rational which also may be its most 
likely meaning with some continuity in the entire Western philosophical tradition.
5. Rational philosophy
I will now try to develop a fuller picture o f what might fairly be called rational 
philosophy, a body o f  claims formed within the logical space o f  reasons. Within 
that space our basic elements are concepts. They are elements within a larger 
whole, a theoretical model, o f which they are parts. Concepts o f rational theory 
are mostly attempts at grasping, explicating, and bringing to the surface shared 
structures, developed primarily as instruments o f  control. Concepts are structural 
moments o f reality, formed by using control as a cognitive model (LakofT, 1987). 
They are often successful, beneficial, helpful instruments o f control. That is a lot. 
But it is not all there is to reality. Within our controlled conceptual grasp we 
know but a side o f things.
In this context we can see the task o f rational philosophy as the construction o f an 
idealized model or framework for all special disciplinary conceptual models, a 
model that will allow us to bring coherence into our theoretical-conceptual world, 
as well as to conceptualize the relation o f  our theories to the greater body o f con­
cepts in everyday life. To use Quinean language: philosophy in this account or­
ganises the web o f scientific beliefs and relates it to wider webs.
The idea that reality is itself given as structured the way philosophy sees it and 
has that structure for all times, combined with the idea that philosophy is our 
authority on truth whereby we order our lives, allowed the West to see philo­
sophy as giving us what Rorty has called a ‘permanent neutral framework’ o f 
truth. This framework gave reason in philosophy the illusion o f being cultural 
overseer. However, work done in this context by Rorty and others has made a 
strong case for concepts neither being given nor forever. We make them and 
change them and they are not inclusive. The latter especially is one o f the rich re­
wards o f George LakofFs empirical linguistic research (Lakoff, 1987).
Nevertheless, conceptual frameworks are or can be objective and can or do work 
for us reliably. Although they are ‘made and not found,’ they are at the same 
time not ‘made up’. Good categories and concepts require careful analysis and 
solid empirical evidence. Objective concepts, though rationally and thus limitedly 
conceived by rational and thus limited people, are not a form o f arbitrary inter­
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ference in reality, partly because o f reality’s resistance to such interference, partly 
because o f respect shown to reality by concept makers.
1 hings in this world are ‘there’ independently from us. Conceptualizing them or 
categorizing them in earnest is real and important work. Though many things 
may not in principle be immune to distortive interference, we also are under se­
vere constraints to avoid such distortion. If we have a concept of sweets that 
allows us to eat them carelessly, our teeth or our girth will inform us of our care­
lessness. That is: reality is ‘corrective’ o f subjective distortion, even though the 
ozone layer tells us that sometimes we can go very long without seeing that we 
are distorting. The ‘other’ that is beyond the sameness o f our conceived order in 
its very otherness has its own ways of preserving ‘objectivity’. But that objec­
tivity can then not, o f course, be one o f being ‘cast out there’, or objectified out­
side o f us by reason. Rather, ‘objective’ will then need to characterize a rela­
tionship o f mutuality in which the other is respected as other, and thus as an other 
whose reality transcends its conceptualization.
Conceptual frameworks largely help us order, structure, or make sense o f our 
experience, our world. When scientifically developed, they also allow us to in­
crease our control in the good sense of the word. And to repeat: other and dif­
ferent are not even completely beyond the sameness of conception, though they 
are conceptualized only as other/ie.v.v, the other and the different, that is, as 
sanies. Though that is reductive, it need not be wrong, so long as we do not con­
sider conceptualization as being comprehensive and remember that to do other 
kinds o f justice to reality we must sing, trust, paint, make love. The limits of 
philosophy or reason thus conceived cannot be overcome philosophically or ra­
tionally. They can at best be observed that way, and then only from a position 
inside the limits.
On this conception of reason as human rationality, reason brings us within the 
logical space o f reasons and for anything to be rational is for it to go through the 
appropriate channels within that space. And for a philosophy to lay claim to 
being a rational philosophy, it would on this conception have to be the philosophy 
which even Rorty recommends, a look in general at things in general within the 
space o f reasons. This kind of philosophy, that is, this construction o f a wide 
theoretical framework which would be a home for our more partial theoretical 
frameworks such as those o f physics, or biology, or sociology, or ethics, would 
be very useful and would contribute considerably to our ability to order our lives.
But there is another view o f philosophy, the view that is oriented more to reason 
as practical reason, now emphatically understood as not theoretical, that is, not as 
reason proceeding within the logical space o f  reasons to provide a more general 
conceptual framework o f  things in general. Kant may have brought out the diffe­
rences most starkly: the issues o f practical life that have to do with ultimate ques­
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tions do not yield to empirical conceptualization within the logical space o f rea­
sons. They cannot be dealt with adequately within the enclosure. They yield 
antinomial incoherencies. But then does not the rational self looking for true gui­
dance in the big issues o f life look in the wrong place if he wants to be primarily 
rational in so doing? Does he not arrogate to reason tasks and functions best left 
to human capacities other than reason? Reason cannot do everything. It misses 
much in its intellectual grasp and is far from comprehensive.
To think that reason is capable o f being cultural overseer and spiritual guide is 
likely a misinterpretation o f what may in itself in certain respects be quite correct. 
If  there is only one world and only one ‘same in all’, then if it is thought that only 
one true theoretical concept o f anything’s structure can be correct and if that 
concept is (mis)taken as a copy or representation o f the real thing out there, then 
conceptual truth can be (mis)taken as ‘correspondence’ to the ‘real’. It will be 
mis-taken if  it is forgotten that the ob-ject originated as a pro-ject. In that inter­
pretation rational truth ‘presents’ to thought, presents all over again within the 
mind, what it takes to exist objectively outside the mind. This picture is then in­
terpreted as essential reality, the encompassing order. If reason takes that mis­
taking even farther, it may also drive us to say -  as our culture has said -  that we 
should not trust anything but reason if we want to know the truth about reality. 
But now reason has been accorded religious tmst and its practitioners differ in no 
way from the priests o f organised religion: they dispense myths. One of these 
myths will be that if  we trust reason, reason does not need trust. Logically, 
within the space o f reasons, this makes no sense o f course. But it is not meant as 
a logic o f reasons, but rather as a reassurance o f trust. It is an antinomial or self- 
referential incoherence only if looked at from within the logical space o f reasons. 
As the confession o f what a tradition ultimately trusts, it makes sense even to a 
reason-trusting rational self.
Reason that disqualifies trust hides the fact that such dis-trust is made possible on 
the basis o f trust-in-reason. Trust in reason thus masks the trust it takes to deny 
our need for trust to know the truth. But in searching for the guidance we need in 
the big issues of human life: who we are, what we will become, what our origin 
and destiny are, the eschatological issues, we cannot depend on an isolated and 
autonomous reason, because the distance we are away from the realities we con­
template in these issues makes rational conceptualization inadequate at best. 
Here we are lost unless we tm st the stories o f trust, the myths that human com­
munities have told us about their journeys through history. Such stories are not 
rational theories. They take the form o f myths, poems, or songs because in these 
forms we can express what in the logical space o f reasons becomes incoherent. 
In a tradition in which reason has the last word, every story o f ultimacy, precisely 
because it is a story and not a theory, will be seen as containing strong rational 
incoherencies. This is amply demonstrated today by many who have trusted the
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story of reason, have duly noted that if turned on itself it reveals self-referential 
incoherencies, and continue to expect the last word on this issue from reason.
Kai Nielsen’s repeated claim, in virtually all o f his many writings in philosophy of 
religion, that the concept o f God in developed Judaism, Islam, or Christianity is 
(logically) incoherent is a fair claim. But it is not a fair accusation which puts its 
finger on something wrong. The word ‘G od’, though requiring concepts for its 
meaning, docs not simply refer to a single, coherent, rational-logical concept. 
Trust that reaches out to our intimations o f reality at the limits o f our experience 
allows itself to be expressed, but not to be abstractly and exclusively argued 
about logically. Reason’s rejection o f trust as a poor substitute for rational com­
mon sense is itself such an incoherent reality o f the world o f trust. For that re­
jection hides from  the light of reason a covert call fo r  trust in reason, which will 
never be revealed in the light o f reason precisely because reason, while trusted, 
hides this from itself. In ultimately trusting reason as the last word, the rational 
self demands so-called rational pronouncements on realities far beyond its reach. 
Reason may in such a situation in one and the same move deny the possibility that 
there are omnipotent beings and covertly act out in pseudo-omnipotence.
In a recent work Nielsen (1993:24) acknowledges that reason as a “necessary 
step on the historical road to universal enlightenment and human self-perfection” 
is a religious myth. And he rejects it. But he also insists that when truth is our 
overriding concern, reason should break ties with concerns that conflict with it 
(Nielsen, 1993:12). Does reason provide the only ultimate clearing for things to 
come to light truly? Perhaps not entirely, for even more recently he has sugges­
ted a positive role for religion in the realm of what he calls “the existential func­
tions o f religion . . . ” (Nielsen, 1994:22). These, for Nielsen, pose questions that 
“standing where we stand now in cultural history, no thoughtful and informed 
person should think she has a good answer to” (Nielsen, 1994:35). And in that 
context he speaks about (rational) truth as possibly “outweighed by other con­
siderations” (Nielsen, 1994:37).
6. Focus on trust
What is this trust I have mentioned? It is a channel o f revelation o f ultimate 
mystery. Life is full o f mystery. It may take some courage for a rational self to 
admit this. But much o f reality is covered over with a veil that is beyond rational 
penetration. That is mystery. Some o f it can be revealed. Revealing is itself 
nothing unusual. For example, when we discover officials did not quite know 
how well prepared the subway trains were for a cold snap, they may excuse 
themselves by saying ‘Only actual winter conditions will fully reveal the con­
dition o f  our machines’. That is all there is to ‘revealing’. Something that was in 
the dark came to light.
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Trust (living-in-trust) reveals whatever truth is available o f life’s boundary mys­
teries: origin, destiny, salvation, suffering, evil, and so on. This requires trusting 
our lives with the narratives o f a tradition. In these narratives the accumulated 
trust o f certain intimations of life’s mystery is deposited as guide for life. They 
clear a space in which light falls on some o f the things otherwise veiled in mys­
tery. In trust some o f the covering comes off. Mystery is revealed in the vul­
nerable action space o f trust, just as structure is conceptualized in the logical 
space o f reasons. Truth o f revealed mystery is aletheia: trust in what shows up in 
a clearing of vulnerability. ‘Resurrection’ may be a word inspiring us with hope 
as we live toward the boundary. A rational or scientific theory o f ‘resurrection’ is 
nonsense. So is a concept o f resurrection logically accessible to reason. But 
living a life oriented to trusting a resurrection narrative will reveal something, 
either truth or a lie.
For example, in capitalism the truth is for sale and the poor pay the price. In 
socialism the truth is belaboured till nobody can afford anything anymore. In 
both worlds the truth is revealed economically in the market. Neither the reason 
o f capitalist multinationals nor the reason o f socialist unions will bring to light the 
lie in today’s market, for in both approaches to the world via the market, truth is 
revealed in the light o f  their trust. In the same way, in the philosophical tradition 
I have been thinking about, truth is not trusted if not coherently conceivable in the 
logical space o f reasons.
It is possible to trust a tradition o f reason as ultimate guide to wisdom and hope, 
and thus to have certain revelations. Reason then becomes trusted as the tme 
source o f all light and as the clearing in which all mystery comes to light. These 
revelations are rooted in trusted articulations o f the trust in reason. They are the 
myths o f the philosophical tradition o f the rational self, such as the myths of 
rational foundations, o f formal languages o f unified science, or o f meaning and 
verification. Even if someone shows theoretically that such articulations are self- 
referentially incoherent, they will survive so long as they are trusted. That is the 
whole point o f their self-referential, in this case rational, incoherence. For these 
ultimates are impenetrable to reason. They are trusted and thereby, instead o f 
having foundations in reason, become foundations for reason.
Only a life lived in trust can put such a trust to shame. Our Western life o f trast 
in rational autonomy reveals to many that this trust is problematic. This trust is 
blind to itself being tmst in rational authority. It seeks to defend itself against the 
accusations o f marginalization by countercharging that a world not governed by 
reason is arbitrary and relativistic, individualistic and subjectivistic. It is intole­
rant to truth o f trust, to truth o f art, or o f love, or o f justice.
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I hope this brief focus on trust has revealed that reason in the West, far from 
having been encompassing and comprehensive, has had its deeper roots in trust 
and has encompassed itself with self-trust. I think this also reveals that trust goes 
deeper and reaches farther than reason ever can or will. But it does not mean that 
we can reject reason. It does not even mean that we cannot trust reason ever or 
at all.
7. Back to reason and philosophy
If the line o f argument developed so far has merit, our approach to problems of 
rational autonomy could be one o f  limiting reason to doing what it can and should 
do: work within its own limits. This approach would not make reason or philo­
sophy more inclusive, but would relativise it. And it would also relativise the 
order o f  reason, especially the order uncovered in the wake of search for control. 
Philosophy would be no more than the internal integration o f  the theoretical 
enterprise.
What about the other, the marginalized, the different? We who are more than ra­
tional as the selves that we are, we as living agents know as we reason that there 
is much more reality beyond reason; reality we as agents love, care for, sing 
about, tmst, and many other things. The self as agent, even in being rational, is 
aware o f  transcendence, mystery, and the other, though not rationally so. 1 know 
more than I think. I also know at other times, for example when I love, trust, 
appreciate, feel, grow, care, sing, listen. All o f these have their limits, as does ra­
tional understanding. We cannot see everything, yet know more than we see. 
We also cannot understand everything, yet know more than we understand. As 
agents we do all o f these. And we can allow our reason to be open to other sides 
o f  our agency, including our ultimate trust.
Philosophy is a legitimate conceptual strategy for conceptual integration o f  our 
conceptual frameworks, theories, worldviews. It brings conceptual comprehen­
sion, coherence and integration to partial concepts and conceptual configurations. 
Conceptually the result is a general totality o f  structural sameness called order, 
traditionally constructed in the enterprise o f ontology. But philosophy in this 
tradition is not guardian o f truth, essence, reality, meaning, justice, the good, and 
mystery. Philosophy in this tradition is also not the enemy o f relativism, irratio­
nality, subjectivity, experience, individuality, the different. It cannot have the 
first/last word. It can, however, thoughtfully contemplate whatever we live by in 
tmst. Thought about a reality revealing itself to tmst, governed by trust’s own 
peculiarities not subject to reason, is legitimate. But it will have to observe its 
limits. What is trusted and what we articulate about our tmst does not fit within 
the logical bounds o f reason. Tmsted omnipotence as well as tnisted rational ju s­
tification o f  reason become incoherent within the logical space o f reasons. The
Koers 59(3 & 4) 1994:569-586 583
Knowing other-wise: a discussion o f alterity and the limits o f philosophy
mythical language o f trust, ultimacy, and revelation in the face o f mystery can be 
known only in being trusted and it is truly trusted only in actively guiding a life 
lived in this trust.
8. Conclusion
If indeed the rise o f philosophy in ancient Greece was from the beginning con­
nected with the replacement o f the tradition of religious faith (in which faith was 
known as a life o f trust and not -  though beliefs were an aspect o f faith -  a 
cognitive body o f beliefs), then it is understandable that the rational-noetic view, 
picture, image, copy o f reality had the religious function o f capturing the truth 
about reality construed as a God's-eye-view. Now that after two millennia we are 
questioning this development because o f its distorting and oppressive conse­
quences, two major approaches emerge as possibilities o f dealing with this W es­
tern inheritance. One would be to acknowledge the limited, relative, and legi­
timate merits o f a very broad conceptual framework to help integrate more partial 
conceptual frameworks and thereby contribute to elements o f coherent ordering 
and wholesome control which are a necessary dimension of human culture. This 
toned down version o f rational philosophy would then not give us privileged 
access to truth, would not be the privileged source o f an immutable and essential 
order which encompassingly encloses all o f reality, and could not be made more 
serviceable by assigning it tasks which transcend the limits o f reason but whose 
outcomes are nevertheless presented as rational. In this approach reason and 
philosophy need to acknowledge faith, religion, and spirituality as normal and le­
gitimate dimensions o f human existence, different from, but not competitors of 
reason, contributing to human experience in their own way.
The other approach would be to continue to regard reason and philosophy as the 
last word on truth, as supreme guide in life and culture, as our most reliable orien­
tation in issues o f origin and destiny. But then this should be acknowledged as 
religious trust in reason and philosophy, where there is no rational justification for 
granting this place to reason, but only hope. This is the religion o f reason, Jas­
pers’ philosophical faith, which can demand no superiority to other religions 
except on the only ground we have to decide issues of ultimacy, namely whether 
the life o f trust in reason delivers human happiness and wellbeing, leads to a flou­
rishing o f human culture, saves us from  oppression, distortion, and suffering more 
than a life o f faith in God. Choice here is, largely, a matter of trust.
10. Postscript
I began this piece with a preface and must end it with a postscript. My explo­
rations between preface and postscript were occasioned by reflections on a theme 
discussed by Stoker and Dooyeweerd and were intended to honour Stoker. But
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the explorations have revealed something I already referred to in the preface: if 
you limit your concern for the other to a philosophical concern for otheme.w, you 
run the risk o f  doing injustice to the other. And Stoker’s philosophy, in spite o f 
his concern for the other, lent comfort to the architects o f apartheid. Not sur­
prisingly, for apartheid may with some justification be called an intellectual 
construct whose builders were unaware o f the pain caused by the concepts they 
so admired. It worked only within the brain, never in the land. So how do I ho­
nour a philosopher whose philosophy is linked to that pain'>
I laving written the paper I wrote, this question is unavoidable. If the voice o f  the 
other cannot be heard as other in philosophy, philosophy and the other are doomed. 
And in this volume o f  intellectuals honouring an intellectual, the ‘others’ in this 
context must be allowed to be present. I owe them a response as to why 1 honour 
Stoker, when 1 demonstrate in my piece that his thought kept them apart from a 
system which aimed to include them.
And this is where I hope the postscript connccts with the preface. Stoker’s con­
cern with alterity as a philosophical concern contributed to injustice. But I trust 
that the concern originated in ‘the other Stoker’. This genuinely pious, humble, 
open child o f the Other and friend o f others was undoubtedly inspired in his 
philosophical concern for alterity by his deep respect for the limits o f reason. It 
put him in touch with all that transcends reason, above all with the Transcendent. 
In his philosophical concern, if we regard it as a ‘postmodern’ intuition that did 
not fully blossom, we may see how Stoker heard the Other pass by (as Levinas 
might put it) or how he preserved a trace of the oilier (as Derrida might put it).
Being an intellectual is a dangerous business, as the history o f reason in the West 
shows. If intellectuals honouring an intellectual would remain shut off in their 
intellectual world, occasions like this volume could thereby alone become offen­
sive. So I have tried in this essay to open intellectual windows to real dangers. 
And I took up this theme because my present discomfort in my own refonnational 
tradition with the remainders o f the autonomy o f reason was in part started by 
Stoker. His plea for alterity in philosophy in discussions with Dooyeweerd in the 
sixties, in which I participated, kindled my discomfort within me. For that reason 
I gratefully honour him, but for that same reason 1 also needed to explore this 
theme in ‘other’ directions.
The philosophical categories o f Stoker’s time tended often not to be informed by 
the lamenting voice o f distorted human relations, especially if  the lament came 
from others. The cry o f  such a voice was likely silenced because it always trans­
cends our concepts. Nevertheless, there was the still, small voice o f  the ‘idion,’ a 
voice within his thought. Today that voicc has more space in which to resound, 
to be echoed. Honouring Stoker in postmodern and rapidly coming post-apart­
heid society could lake the form of hearing the voice o f the idion, and /rusting it.
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